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In Halleron v. United Companies Mortgage & Investment,
Inc.," a bankrupt sued for damages for alleged breach of a con-
tract to lend money. Defendant filed an exception of no right
of action on the ground that plaintiff's right, if any, had passed
to his trustee in bankruptcy. The exception was sustained, and
the court of appeal affirmed. If there was a breach of contract
it occurred prior to the date of bankruptcy. Section 70a (6) of
the Bankruptcy Act provides: "The trustee of the estate of a
bankrupt... shall.., be vested by operation of law with the
title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is
to property which is held to be exempt, to all the following
kinds of property wherever located . . . (6) rights of action
arising upon contracts .... "2
EFFECT OF DIscHARGE
All State Credit Plan Broad, Inc. v. Calmes8 was an action
by discharged bankrupts to annul a default judgment against
them. The discharge had been received before the date of the
judgment, and the bankrupts accordingly were under a necessity
to plead their discharge as an affirmative defense.4 They had
failed to do so, and annulment of the default judgment thus
was improper. This problem, which has frequently been pre-
sented to Louisiana courts,5 should arise less often in the future
by reason of a 1970 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, which
will be summarized below.
A valid lien on property not administered in bankruptcy is
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 256 So.2d 475 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(6) (1970).
3. 262 So.2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
4. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1005.
5. See The Work of the Louisaia Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Bankruptcy, 32 LA. L. REv. 291 (1972); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term--Bankruptcy, 31 LA. L. REV. 307
(1971); and The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term-Bankruptcy, 30 LA. L. REV. 267 (1970).
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unaffected by the discharge." Finance System, Inc. v. TerrelT
illustrates this rule. In Louisiana National Bank v. Wicker,8 the
chattel mortgage sought to be enforced was not valid under
Louisiana law and in any event was inferior to other secured
interests.
Property subject to a valid mortgage may be unadministered
in bankruptcy for the reason that it was disclaimed by the
trustee as fully encumbered or otherwise without value to the
estate, or that it was exempt.9 If exempt property later loses its
exempt status, as where a homestead is abandoned, a judicial
mortgage may then be enforced against it. 1° A conventional
or a judicial mortgage may not be enforced against property
acquired after bankruptcy by a discharged bankrupt,1 1 as this
would frustrate one of the principal purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
In Kayda v. Johnson,12 a discharged bankrupt filed under
R.S. 9:516618 a rule to show cause why the inscription of a
judicial mortgage should not be cancelled. The clerk of court
(ex officio recorder of mortgages) and the judgment creditors
were defendants. The statute reads:
"Upon rule to show cause by any interested party against
the clerk of court and ex officio recorder of mortgages... ,
the judgment creditor and a judgment debtor discharged in
bankruptcy, the court shall order the cancellation of the
inscription of any dischargeable judgment rendered twelve
months previously unless the judgment creditor can prove
that he continues to possess a secured interest in the prop-
erty affected by such judgment, or any judgment rendered
in a tort proceeding wherein the judgment debtor's liability
arose out of his wilful negligence, or any judgment for taxes
due or any other judgment otherwise not discharged in
bankruptcy."
The trial court recalled and vacated the rule, and the judg-
ment debtor appealed. Being uncertain whether the 1970 Act
6. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.29 (1971).
7. 259 So.2d 583 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
8. 259 So.2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 75(a)(6) (1970).
10. Schexnailder v. Fontenot, 147 La. 467, 85 So. 207 (1920).
11. Huff v. Justice, 174 So.2d 164 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
12. 252 So.2d 708 (La. App. lst Cir. 1971).
13. LA. R.S. 9:5166 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 588.
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had been applied and whether the judgment creditor had been
given an opportunity to meet its burden under the statute of
proving a continuing secured interest in the property affected
by the judgment (here an exempt homestead), the court of
appeal reversed, and remanded the case for trial. After a hear-
ing the trial court ordered that the inscription of the judgment
be cancelled, and the judgment creditor appealed. The court of
appeal again reversed.14
The 1970 statute created a new procedure for the cancellation
of inscriptions by rule, but made no change in the existing sub-
stantive law. Under that law, a judgment inscribed prior to the
debtor's bankruptcy could not affect "property acquired by the
debtor after . . . bankruptcy. Schexnailder v. Fontenot, 147
La. 467, 85 So. 207 (1920). As an extension of this rule," Jaubert
Bros., Inc. v. Landry15 held "that equity accrued by payments
made on a secured obligation, affecting the property the bank-
rupt owned prior to . . .bankruptcy, would be considered as
property acquired after... bankruptcy and therefore not affected
by a judgment."16 In Jaubert the court had said that if the judg-
ment debtor "can show . . . that at the time of the adjudication
the property set apart to him as a homstead was worth no more
than the balance due on the purchase price, he could have the
homestead declared free from the judicial mortagage ... ,
The conclusion was rightly drawn in Kayda that
"where the inability of the judgment creditor to enforce his
judgment against the bankrupt is due to the homestead
exemption rather than a lack of equity on the part of the
bankrupt because of conventional obligations against the
property, the law has been, and remains that the inscription
of the judgment acquired prior to . . . bankruptcy is not
cancelled. Were the rule otherwise, the homestead status
of the property could change and the judgment creditor
would have no recourse."' 8
At the time of bankruptcy, the property in Kayda had a value
of $16,600. It was subject to two conventional mortgages, the
first with a balance owed of $11,826 and the second with a
14. 262 So.2d 171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
15. 15 So.2d 158 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
16. Kayda v. Johnson, 262 So.2d 171, 174 (La. App. 1st Or. 1972).
17. 15 So.2d at 161.
18. 262 So.2d 171, 174 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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balance owed of $1,650. "Thus the inability of the judgment
creditor to enforce his judgment against the property was due
to the homestead exemption as well as the prior conventional
mortgages."' 9 The court of appeal correctly held that cancella-
tion of the inscription should have been denied. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ballard20 took the same view, though
without reference to the statute.
Ferguson v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.2' was an action by
judgment debtors who had been discharged in bankruptcy,
against a judgment creditor and the sheriff to cancel a judg-
ment and to enjoin seizure and sale of property that had been
set apart by the bankruptcy court as the debtors' homestead.
After a hearing at which no evidence of the value of the proper-
ty was' introduced, the trial court dismissed the rule to cancel
the judicial mortgage and the rule for injunction. The court
of appeal reversed and rendered judgment for plaintiffs. Under
R.S. 9:5166 a discharged bankrupt is entitled to cancellation of
any judgment against him unless the judgment creditor can
prove a secured interest in the property "by showing that the
debtor had an equity therein over and above all encumbrances
bearing against it .... Kayda v. Johnson, 262 So.2d 171 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1972), ... held that in determining whether there
is a 'secured interest,' the homestead exemption may not be
considered .... -22 As the judgment creditor had failed to
carry its burden of proof, the judgment debtors were entitled
to have the judicial mortgage cancelled.
In Fulmer v. Harper,28 the issue was whether post-bank-
ruptcy wages of a wife, who had been discharged in bankruptcy,
were subject to garnishment by a creditor whose claim had
been duly scheduled as a liability of the estate. The creditor
got judgment in November, 1962 against husband and wife
for the balance due on a promissory note. Husband and wife
both became bankrupt. The wife was discharged in September,
1963; the husband did not receive a discharge. In January, 1971
the judgment creditor caused the wife's employer to be cited
as garnishee. The wife then filed a rule to vacate the garnish-
ment proceeding on the ground that the debt had been dis-
19. Id.
20. 250 So.2d 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
21. 265 So.2d 250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
22. Id, at 251.
23. 265 So.2d 355 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
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charged in bankruptcy. The trial court entered judgment vacat-
ing the garnishment. The court of appeal set aside this judg-
ment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The debt
was discharged as to the wife's separate estate, but it remained
a debt of the husband's separate estate and of the community;
and wages earned by a wife who is living with her husband
are community assets.
However logical this conclusion may seem, it cannot be
accepted as consistent with the Bankruptcy Act. The United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt24 held that a bankruptcy court in Illinois had properly
enjoined a creditor, whose debtor had been discharged in bank-
ruptcy, from enforcing a pre-bankruptcy assignment of wages
thereafter to be earned. Under the Illinois decisions such an
assignment of future wages created a lien effective from the date
of the assignment which was not invalidated by the assignor's
discharge in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court, however, rejected
the Illinois decisions as destructive of the purpose and spirit
of the Bankruptcy Act. Fulmer v. Harper is subject to the same
objection.
DEBTS UNAFFECTED BY DISCHARGE
Section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides in part:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts . . . except such as . . . (2) are
liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit
in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing
respecting his financial condition made or published or
caused to be made or published in any manner whatsoever
with intent to deceive .... ,,25
Where after his debtor's bankruptcy a creditor brings action
on a claim that was properly scheduled and is met with a plea
of discharge in bankruptcy, the plaintiff has been required to
show: "(1) [t]hat defendant made false representations; (2)
that these representations were made with the intention of
24. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (2) (1970).
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defrauding the plaintiff, and (3) that the plaintiff relied upon
and was misled by the false pretenses or representations. '2
Recently, of six such cases five were decided in favor of
the discharged bankrupt. In one case7 it was held that the state-
ment was not materially false and that the creditor did not
rely on it. In another case,28 the representations though false
were made without fraudulent intent. In two cases,29 there was
no fraudulent intent and no reliance by the creditor. In yet
another case 8° there was no falsity, no fraudulent intent, and
no reliance. Only in a single instance81 did the creditor prevail.
Section 17a (2) provides further:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts . . . except such as . . . (2) are
liabilities . . . for willful and malicious conversion of the
property of another .... "
Section 17a(8) adds: "or (8) are liabilities for willful and
malicious injuries to the person or property of another other
than conversion as excepted under clause (2) of this subdivision."
Southern Fleet Leasing Corp. v. Brown 2 decided that the
sale of business machines, in violation of the terms of a so-called
lease under which the machines were held, gave rise to a liability
that was not discharged in bankruptcy. It is clear that "the
conversion of another's property without his knowledge or con-
sent, done intentionally and without justification and excuse,
to the other's injury, is a willful and malicious injury within the
meaning of the exception."88 Credit Plan, Inc. v. Domingue,3 '
however, recognized that disposal of mortgaged chattels which
had become valueless was neither a willful and malicious con-
version of property nor a willful and malicious injury to prop-
erty.
26. Delatour v. Lala, 131 So. 211, 212 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
27. Finance System, Inc. v. Terrell, 259 So.2d 583 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
28. CHF Fin. Discount "A" Co. v. Robinson, 249 So.2d 217 (La. App. 4th
Cr. 1971).
29. All State Credit Plan, Inc. v. Wilson, 254 So.2d 315 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971); All State Credit Plan Harahan, Inc. v. Anderson, 250 So.2d 806
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
30. Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Wicker, 259 So.2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
31. King Fin. Co. v. Johnson, 265 So.2d 658 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
32. 257 So.2d 819 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
33. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17 (1) (1971).
34. 253 So.2d 652 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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Section 17a (3) provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts . . .except such as . . . (3) have
not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt
unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
proceedings in bankruptcy ....
Central Credit Corp. v. Ravencra ft8 5 was an action by the
assignee of a note. The defense was discharge in bankruptcy.
Defendant prevailed in the trial court but lost on appeal. The
debt had been scheduled by the bankrupt not in the name of
the assignee but in the name of the payee of the note. Where
a debtor does not know of an assignment, he may duly schedule
the debt in the name of the original creditor, and he is under
no duty to ascertain whether an assignment has been made. 6
But where as here he knows of the assignment, he must schedule
in the name of the assignee. The debt accordingly was not duly
scheduled, and the burden was on the debtor to prove that the
creditor had notice or knowledge of the proceeding., Publica-
tion in the "Daily Legal News" of defendant's bankruptcy did
not amount to notice, and actual knowledge by the creditor was
not shown.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ballard,88 defen-
dant had duly scheduled the debt in plaintiff's name with plain-
tiff's home office given as the address, and notice had been mailed
to plaintiff at that address by the referee in bankruptcy. The
court of appeal rightly held that defendant's personal liability
was discharged notwithstanding plaintiff's alleged failure to
receive the notice.89
The date of bankruptcy in all the foregoing cases was earlier
than December 18, 1970, the effective date of Public Law 91-467.
Among other changes, this latest amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act empowered courts of bankruptcy to determine the discharge-
ability of any debt; to render judgment for a non-discharge-
able debt and order enforcement; to nullify any judgment as a
determination of personal liability on a discharged debt; and
35. 258 So.2d 560 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
36. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (3) (1971).
37. Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923).
38. 250 So.2d 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
39. U. Koen & Co. v. Accardo, 188 So.2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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to enjoin creditors from suing on, or using any process to
collect, a discharged debt.
PROMISE TO PAY DISCHARGED DEBT
A new promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is
actionable without new consideration, in Louisiana40 as else-
where.41 The promise may be made at any time after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, 42 but it must be "definite, express,
distinct, and unambiguous. '" 48 These requirements were satisfied
in Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Nash, 44 where the court found
a specific promise to pay at a fixed future time. A mere acknowl-
edgement of the debt with an expression of intent to pay at
an indefinite time would not have been sufficient.45
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
NoN-DomIcIIARIEs' "JOINT AccoUNTs" IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana law of things does not admit of co-ownership with
right of survivorship, the essence of "joint" interests in things
according to the traditional Anglo-American law. Thus, two
Mississippians having a joint bank account in Mississippi justi-
fiably could expect to have the survivor of them become owner
of the whole. Conversely, two Louisianians having what is
known here as a "joint" bank account should not expect the
survivor of them to become owner of the whole; they should
understand that the "jointness" of an account is not a reference
to ownership thereof, but to the right of either of them to with-
draw funds therefrom without prejudice to the depositary. On
the other hand, Louisianians having a joint bank account in
Mississippi might or might not anticipate the result under Mis-
sissippi law, and Mississippians having a "joint" bank account
in Louisiana might or might not expect the result under Louisi-
ana law.
40. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.2d 485 (1945).
41. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.33 (1971).
42. Id. § 17.36.
43. Id. § 17.34.
44. 256 So.2d 308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
45. Securities Fin. Co. v. Washington, 195 So.2d 733 (La. App. 1st Cir.
(1967).
0 Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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